Marriage between persons of the same sex is not recognized in Georgia. This includes marriages performed pursuant to licenses issued by another state or foreign jurisdiction. OCGA 19-3-30 (B) (1). The statute clearly states that no marriage license shall be issued to persons of the same sex. Marriage licenses shall be issued only by the judge of the probate court or his clerk at the county courthouse between the hours of 8 AM and 6 PM Monday through Saturday.Some might ask what happened in the event that any marriage license is not returned for recording, as provided in subsection C of this code section, either party to a ceremonial marriage may establish a marriage by submitting to the judge of the probate court the affidavits of two witnesses to the marriage ceremony setting forth the date, the place, and the name of the official minister performing the ceremony. The judge shall thereupon reissue the marriage license and enter there on the certificate of marriage and all dates and names in accordance with the evidence submitted and shall record and cross index same in the proper chronological order in the book kept for that purpose. Contact a Paulding county divorce lawyer today.

What happens when you lose your divorce case?
The Georgia Supreme Court this does not include the Georgia Court of Appeals, will automatically grant all nonfrivolous applications in divorce and or alimony cases, i.e., those discretionary applications timely filed from the final judgment and decree of divorce, unless the application is found to be frivolous. The filing attorney must certify

1) the application is not taken for the purpose of delay, harassment, or embarrassment 2) that the attorney is familiar with the trial court record and based on the attorneys understanding of applicable law the attorney has a good faith belief that the appeal has merit 3) the attorney has been authorized by the client applicant to file the application. Opposing counsel has an option to address the frivolity issue within 10 days of docketing. A penalty up to $2500 can be assessed against the applicant attorney for a frivolous appeal.
Accordingly, in determining the proper procedure to follow on appeal, a direct appeal will not lie from a judgment granting divorce but appeal must be brought by application where the underlying  subject matter is divorce,

2) a direct appeal will Iie where the underlying subject matter is a separate child custody order being appealed, and 3) where the underlying subject matter is a divorce case in which child custody is an issue, an application for discretionary appeal is required,
In  an appeal were the order or judgment is not interlocutory and where the underlying subject matter upon which the appellate court's constitutional jurisdiction is based is that of divorce, there must be compliance with OCGA section 5-6-35, or the appeal will be dismissed.
 and a direct appeal will not lie. A determination of the underlying subject matter is required in determining the proper appellate procedure to follow.  Contact a lawyer from Dallas Georgia to help you with your case.

Contact a Paulding County lawyer today

Under section 111 of the FEHA IP legislation any applicable plan is the responsible reporting entity R.R. v. inapplicable planning Kluge liability insurance no-fault insurance and worker's compensation plan. The RRE are responsible for reporting claims. The RRE are responsible for reporting the identity of the Medicare beneficiary whose illness, injury, incident, or accident is in dispute when they become aware of the claim. The RRE must also report payment information to assist CMS regarding coordination of benefits and any claims to recover Medicare overpayments. The information provided will allow Medicare to determine if there are any any NGHP entities that may be available at the primary payer at the time of the  are incident. rre can submit a query to the coordination of benefits contractor regarding potential Medicare beneficiary prior to submitting a claim. The query would include the name of the injured party, date of birth, gender, and either their Social Security number or Medicare health insurance claim number of the injured party. It is determined the party is a Medicare beneficiary, the RRE must submit a claim input file including: identity and injured party including toll security number and tax ID number, representative attorney of the injured party including tax ID number, beneficiary of the injured party, description of the illness or injury, incident information, insurer named an RRE tax ID number, policy information, and payment information. There are additional reporting requirements in product liability claims regarding the name and brand of the product and the alleged harm. If there are multiple R.R. E.S, each one must report. Him and him and he is responsible for complying with section 111 are referred to as responsible reporting entity or RRE. The total payment obligation to the claimant refers to the dollar amount of the settlement, judgment, award, or other payment in addition to or apart from ORM. A generally reflects a one-time or lump-sum settlement judgment award or other payment intended to resolve or partially resolve a claim. It is the dollar amount of the total payment obligation to, or on behalf of the injured party in connection with the settlement, judgment, award, or other payment.

Liability insurance coverage that indemnifies or pays on behalf of the policyholder or self-insured entity against claims for negligence, and inappropriate action, or inaction which results in injury or illness to an individual or damage to property . Include but not limited to the following: homeowner's liability insurance, automobile liability insurance, product liability insurance, malpractice liability insurance, uninsured motorist liability insurance, underinsured motorist liability insurance. Liability insurance means insurance that provides payment based on legal liability for injury or illness or damage to property. It includes but is not limited to automobile liability insurance, uninsured motorist insurance, underinsured motorist insurance, homeowners liability insurance, malpractice insurance, product liability insurance, and Gen. casualty insurance.Ask a paulding county criminal defense lawyer about your case today.

Medicare advantage plan does not have the same super lien | Paulding county attorney

The Medicare advantage organizations are insurance companies that contract with Medicare to provide Medicare benefits pursuant to part C of the medical care law, 42 U.S.C. 130 9W-20 1A1. Although the Medicare secondary payer act law applies to Medicare advantage plans a recent Federal District Court decision in Pennsylvania held, as many have argued, that Medicare advantage plan being purely insurance agreements affording benefits equivalent to Medicare did not fall within the statute and regulations governing the Medicare liens. Humana v. Glaxo SmithKline 2011 US Dist. Lexis 63544 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2011). Instead the District Court held, any right of recovery by MAO depends on the language in the insurance policy and applicable state law. Under this analysis, under Georgia law a Medicare advantage plan would occupy no greater status than an ordinary group plan i.e. is not permitted to subrogate against primary payer's, and the right of reimbursement from a beneficiary under the plan is subject to the made whole doctrine and the other provisions of OCGA 33-24-56.1. Although the Humana case involved a great deal of money, and it is a very well reasoned opinion, it does not appear to be a reported decision. Thus, under local rules of the Northern District of Georgia, its value as precedent is subject to question. Nevertheless, there is a great deal written about this decision, though the case itself is not appealed. Generally, plaintiff lawyers appeared to be responding to notices for Medicare advantage plan by taking the position that it is not entitled to the traditional Medicare lien, and will be treated like a health insurer seeking reimbursement pursuant to Georgia law. There is no reason to think that claims of lien pursuant to Medicare part D affording prescription benefits should be treated any differently than a Medicare advantage  plan, since Medicare part D similarly underwritten by insurers that contract with the government.Contact a Paulding county lawyer today for help with your case.

If I settle my damage claim for my personal injury case will that affect my right to pursue the Bodily Injury portion of my claim? | Douglasville DUI lawyer

When demand is a condition precedent, it must not be made prematurely, for such cases equivalent to no demand at all. It need not necessarily be made by the party himself, it is sufficient if it is made by an agent. An averment though often requested will not suffice because the time and place of, together with the demand actually made, and by and upon whom made, must be set out so that the court may judge its efficiency. A demand as a statutory prerequisite under certain types of action should not be confused with demand for judgment under the civil practice act. While demand is required under certain statutes as a precondition to an action and a failure to make such a demand may be fatal, the failure to demand appropriate relief in a complaint will not result in dismissal. Sometimes the statute requires notice as a condition precedent to the accrual or bringing of an action, for example, notice is required to be given to the defendant for the payment of attorneys fees for the collection of notes, and notice of an injury as required by the Worker's Compensation act. Ordinarily where a notice is required for the benefit of the defendant he may waive it but where the public has an interest such as in the case of the notice for the collection of attorney fees it may not be waived. For notice as affecting delivery under UCC see OCGA 11-2-616. Under O.C.G.A. 51-1-34 settlement of a cause of action for property damage will not prevent the claimant from bringing an action for personal injury where both claims arose out of the same motor vehicle collision. Unless, of course, the settlement contains general language intended to release both claims. When there is no settlement, the injured party has a separate and distinct cause of action against the person causing the physical injury to his person and a separate distinct cause of action for the injuries to his property. The injured party has a right, in his sole discretion, to prosecute each cause of action separately or combine the two cause of actions in a single action.

A creditor in imminent need of money may not sue for a some admitted to be due and reserve an action for part of his claim which is in dispute. However, it has been held that, when by agreement and account for goods sold is on the same day divided into four parts, each falling on a separate day, the plaintiff might maintain a separate suit on each part, and cannot be forced to unite them so that jurisdiction will be defeated. Closely analyzed, the situation under these circumstances is not really in instances splitting, nor is an exception to the rule against splitting. The code provides that if a contract is entire only one action can be maintained for breach thereof, but, if it is severable, or if the breaches occur at successive periods in entire contract an actual lie for each breach, but all the breaches occurring up to the commencement of action must be included therein. Amendment of pleadings so as to seek recovery of installment payments due between final judgment and filing is permitted but not required. Since action  and seek recovery only for right up until the filing of action, and additional suit occurring after the filing of the first action would not be abated by pendency of the first action. O.C.G.A. 9-2-44 which provides for the defense of former recovery and pendency, serves further to enforce rule against splitting. O.C.G.A. 9-2-5a and 9-2-44a O.C.G.A. 9-to-44. Appellant wife sued appellee husband for divorce, child custody and support. The trial judge granted temporary child custody to wife with visitation rights to husband. Before this order was filed was voluntarily dismissed divorce petition and took children to Florida. The trial court granted husband's motion to set aside a wise dismissal of the petition as to visitation rights. The husband sued for divorce, permanent custody child support and alimony. As parties occupy different states and to suits OCG a A9-2-5 was inapplicable. However trial court erred in denying wife's motion to dismiss husband sued as OCGA9-2-44 applied. Bedingfield v. Bedingfield 248 Ga. 91.  1981.  Of CGA 9-2-44 which provides for the defense and of former recovery and pendency, serves further to enforce rule against splitting. 

Action is not a pending suit until after service of process is perfected until after service of process is perfected, when service is made it relates back to the date of filing, and the date of filing establishes the date the action is commenced.  Thus once the suit is served it is in law or in commencement or filing the complaint that determines which action is the prior action.

OCGA 9-11-18a plaintiff's complaint against defendant was dismissed after defendant as third-party plaintiff impleaded third-party defendant to file against him direst damage claims as well as claims for secondary liability.  In this situation, provisions of civil practice act cannot specify what a trial court loses jurisdiction over third-party direct damage claim.  Thus Court was persuaded to view taken by most federal courts that jurisdiction over third-party direct damage claim is not destroyed if original action is sold or disposed of in some fashion before adjudication of such claim, but trial court, in exercise of its discretion either may proceed with claim or dismiss.  Cohen v. McLaughlin 250 Ga. 661 (1983).  Assuming arguendo that Florida contempt order could be directly enforced in this state pursuant to domestication proceedings instituted in accordance with OCGA 9-12-130 does not follow that appellant was required to undertake such domestication proceedings as condition precedent to bringing conversion action in this state based on his alleged ownership of property.  The court rejected appellants' theory that her petition for equitable partitioning was in rem proceeding which did not subject her to personal jurisdiction of trial court.  OCGA 9-11-8e DHR may in one judicial proceeding seek to establish paternity and obligation of support pursuant Child support recovery Dep't Department of human resources v. Carlton 174 Ga. App. 30 (1985).  OCGA 9-11-18(b) in particular plaintiff may join a claim for money and a claim to set aside a fraudulent conveyance.  The civil practice act provides for the liberal joinder of claims and parties for the benefit purpose of avoiding multiplicity of suits, conflicting decisions and to see that justice and equity obtains in all situations.  Cotton mental Ins. Co. v. Mercer 130 Ga. App. 339 (1973).  In demand for statutory lien or in the alternative equitable lien is permissible.  There is no inhibition to joinder of actions  ex contractu and those ex delicto, insurance carrier, motor carrier in third-party tortfeasor's faith be proceeded against in one action.  A plaintiff may pursue a number consistent or inconsistent remedies against the same person or different person until he obtained the satisfaction from some of them.  The 2 or more claims may be filed at the same time, or by the use of amendments.  A separate trial of issues may be ordered by the court.  Schuck v. Henderson 134 Ga. App. 808 (1975).  It has been held that where complaint seeks both legal and equitable relief and the complaint shows a claim on which relief either legal or equitable, may be granted in it is not subject to dismissal.  In one case, plaintiffs were entitled to remain in court under their pleading whereby one count proceed upon a breach of contract and another count was based upon a tort alleging a conspiracy involving a party other than the contracting parties.  OCGA 9-12-40 is a codification George's basic common law rule of res judicata.  However for one action to act as a bar to a subsequent action, the two actions must share certain characteristics first parties to the two actions must be identical and second, the subject matter of the actions must also be identical.  Here, the parties to the two actions are identical, however, the subject matter of the actions is not.  The first lawsuit dealt with a series of debts owed Watkins by Lawson.  The present lawsuit deals with title to a racetrack.  The racetrack was involved in the first lawsuit only to the extent that Lawson's counterclaim dealt with in reformation of a promissory note for which the racetrack properly serve as collateral.  The racetrack was not the subject matter the complaint in the first action, nor was it the subject matter the counterclaim in that action.  Because the subject matter of the two actions were not identical, the trial court in the present action correctly denied Lawson's motion to dismiss as to the res judicata issue.  Our joinder statute OCGA 9-11-18 provides for permissive joinder of claims for relief.  In the first action, Watkins chose to assert only his claims for relief relating to various loans he had made to Lawson during their business relationship.  When Lawson counterclaimed in the first action seeking relief concerning the promissory note, for the sake of judicial economy perhaps it would've been best to have litigated the issue to title of a the racetrack in that action.  However, the issue had not been joined in the pleadings or in an appropriate pretrial order and, under such circumstances, the trial court in the first action correctly determined, the day of trial, that issue cannot be litigated once all parties agreed, which Lawson refused to do.  That the issue of title to the racetrack could have been put in issue in the previous lawsuit does not require a finding under OCGA 9-12-40 that the issue is now res judicata.  In and thus one must assert all claims for relief concerning the same subject matter in one lawsuit and any claims for relief concerning that same subject matter which are not raised will be rests jury, pursuant to OCGA 9-12-40.  However, in any situation where, as here, a plaintiff has multiple dealings with the defendant, and our law does not require that he assert every separate claim for relief that he may have against the defendant in one single lawsuit or risk losing the claim for relief forever, as would be the case if our joinder statute provided for mandatory rather than permissive joinder.  Instead our law requires that such a plaintiff must bring every claim for relief he has concerning the same subject matter in one lawsuit.   is in the previous action, and Watkins chose to bring suit against Lawson for every claim for relief he had against loss and that arose out of loans he had made a loss.  Watkins chose not to include his claims for relief that arose out of the racetrack which he had given to Lawson in trust.  To construe OCGA 9-12-42 required the inclusion of all claims for relief which could have been raised under OCGA 9-11-18 as the dissent suggests, would require compulsory joinder of unrelated claim.  Such a construction would not only defeat the purpose for which OCGA 9-11-18a was enacted but would render the same meaningless.  The civil practice act does not affect venue and jurisdiction see OCGA 9-11-82.  Therefore, venue and jurisdictional requirements could prevent a joinder of claims or parties in spite of the liberalization intended by the civil practice act.  See also Pemberton v. Purifoy 128 Ga. App. 892 (1973).  Death of party to a pending action automatically suspends action as to that party until someone is substituted for him.  Until substitution occurs further proceedings in case are void as to that party.  Omak Indus. Inc. v. Alwine, 164 Ga. App. 397 (1982).  Claim for equitable division of property pending in divorce proceedings do not survive death of claimant spouse during pendency of proceedings and prior to entry of divorce decree.  However, equitable claim to property filed or maintained on resulting trust theory survived that the spouse.  Cigars v. Brooks 248 Ga Ga. 427 (1981).  When appellant died and his causes of action whether based on a statute contract or tort did not abate but rather survived to his legal representative.  Dudley v. Watt Co. v. a bank NA 290 Ga. App. 220 (2008).  In the event of death of the wrongdoer prior to suit, his personal representative is subject to suit, but punitive damages are not authorized.  Attorney fees and expenses are generally not recoverable as damages.  However a jury may award them or their recovery especially pled and the finding of stubborn litigiousness bad faith or unnecessary trouble and expenses is made.  When an opposing party asserts a claim, defense or other position which is so lacking in the existence of a justiciable issue of law or fact that it is beyond reasonable belief the court would except it, attorney fees and expenses will be awarded against the opposing party and his or her attorney.  The bringing of suit or assertion of the defense which lacks substantial justification which was interposed for delay, or which unnecessarily expansive proceeding by abuse of discovery or other improper conduct can also result in a court awarding attorney's fees and expenses upon its own motion or the motion of any party.  OCGA 9-15-14 ( b.  In trial court retains discretion to decide whether attorney fees should be awarded even when party prevails on abuse of litigation claim.  OCGA 9-15-14 (b).  Contact an attorney from the Howard Law group today for a free consultation.

What's a condition precedent in the law ? | Howard Law Group

Where in the law there remains a condition precedent to the bringing of an action or the parties either expressly or by necessary implication make a condition precedent in a contract that condition must be complied with before an action will lie, unless it is waived or compliance is prevented by some act of the defendant. While general language affirmatively pleading performance of conditions precedent satisfies the civil practice than not all the performances were met of a condition precedent must be stated with specificity and particularity. Procurement of a certificate of authority to transact business is a condition precedent to a foreign corporations capacity to commence or maintain any suit or proceeding in any court of the state. The subsequent procurement of the certificate and later refiling of an action dismissed for failure to procure the certificate will cure the original failure to comply with this condition precedent and defense of res judicata will not lie to bar the second suit. no demand is necessary as a condition precedent to the commencement of an action, except in such cases where the law on the contract requires that such a man shall be made the following citations are instances of this rural abatement of nuisance by evening he posts EGA 41-1-5.

Word demand is a condition precedent, it must not be made prematurely, for such cases equivalent to no demand at all. It need not necessarily be made by the party himself, it is sufficient if it is made by an agent. An averment though often requested will not suffice because the time and place of, together with the demand actually made, and by and upon whom made, must be set out so that the court may judge its efficiency. A demand as a statutory prerequisite under certain types of action should not be confused with demand for judgment under the civil practice act. While demand is required under certain statutes as a precondition to an action and a failure to make such a demand may be fatal, the failure to demand appropriate relief in a complaint will not result in dismissal. Sometimes the statute requires notice as a condition precedent to the accrual or bringing of an action, for example, notice is required to be given to the defendant for the payment of attorneys fees for the collection of notes, and notice of an injury as required by the Worker's Compensation act. Ordinarily where a notice is required for the benefit of the defendant he may waive it but where the public has an interest such as in the case of the notice for the collection of attorney fees it may not be waived. For notice as affecting delivery under UCC see OCGA 11-2-616. Under O.C.G.A. 51-1-34 settlement of a cause of action for property damage will not prevent the claimant from bringing an action for personal injury where both claims arose out of the same motor vehicle collision. Unless, of course, the settlement contains general language intended to release both claims. When there is no settlement, the injured party has a separate and distinct cause of action against the person causing the physical injury to his person and a separate distinct cause of action for the injuries to his property. The injured party has a right, in his sole discretion, to prosecute each cause of action separately or combine the two cause of actions in a single action.

A creditor in imminent need of money may not sue for a some admitted to be due and reserve an action for part of his claim which is in dispute. However, it has been held that, when by agreement and account for goods sold is on the same day divided into four parts, each falling on a separate day, the plaintiff might maintain a separate suit on each part, and cannot be forced to unite them so that jurisdiction will be defeated. Closely analyzed, the situation under these circumstances is not really in instances splitting, nor is an exception to the rule against splitting. The code provides that if a contract is entire only one action can be maintained for breach thereof, but, if it is severable, or if the breaches occur at successive periods in entire contract an actual lie for each breach, but all the breaches occurring up to the commencement of action must be included therein. Amendment of pleadings so as to seek recovery of installment payments due between final judgment and filing is permitted but not required. Since action  and seek recovery only for right up until the filing of action, and additional suit occurring after the filing of the first action would not be abated by pendency of the first action. O.C.G.A. 9-2-44 which provides for the defense of former recovery and pendency, serves further to enforce rule against splitting. O.C.G.A. 9-2-5a and 9-2-44a O.C.G.A. 9-to-44. Appellant wife sued appellee husband for divorce, child custody and support. The trial judge granted temporary child custody to wife with visitation rights to husband. Before this order was filed was voluntarily dismissed divorce petition and took children to Florida. The trial court granted husband's motion to set aside a wise dismissal of the petition as to visitation rights. The husband sued for divorce, permanent custody child support and alimony. As parties occupy different states and to suits OCGA9-2-5 was inapplicable. However trial court erred in denying wife's motion to dismiss husband sued as OCGA 9-2-44 applied. Bedingfield v. Bedingfield 248 Ga. 91.  1981.  Of CGA 9-2-44 which provides for the defense and of former recovery and pendency, serves further to enforce rule against splitting. 

Action is not a pending suit until after service of process is perfected until after service of process is perfected, when service is made it relates back to the date of filing, and the date of filing establishes the date the action is commenced.  Thus once the suit is served it is in law or in commencement or filing the complaint that determines which action is the prior action. Contact Howard Law Group for a free consultation.

My drug dealer ripped me off do I get my money back ? | Douglasville DUI law

A cause of action accrues when a legal right which is vested, as distinguished from contingent or conditional in the plaintiff is violated by the defendant. However, in the right depends upon some condition or contingency, the cause of action accrues only from the fulfillment of that condition or happening of the contingency, and if brought before it is considered premature.

Only the parties to the action can raise the objection that is brought prematurely. No cause of action for damages can arise out of an illegal transaction because to authorize a recovery in such a case would be contrary to public policy. For example, no action can be maintained upon a contract growing out of an immoral or illegal transaction, the transaction was not subsequent or collateral, but directly connected with the unlawful act. The test to determine whether a demand connected with illegal transaction is capable of being enforced at laws whether the plaintiff requires any aid from the illegal transaction to establish his case. Thus an action involving a contract for contingency fee in a criminal prosecution, declared void as against public policy.The law clearly states that you cannot sue your drug dealer if he rips you off.  As you can see, a drug deal is obviously an illegal transaction and the law forbids you from having a remedy when a portion of your remedy is dependent upon an action that is illegal.  Therefore if you are ripped off by a drug dealer you have no remedy under the law.  Do not call the police in this situation.  If you are charged with a drug crime contact the Howard Law Group.